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Abstract
This paper investigates the long-run economic relationship between
health care expenditure and income in the US at a State level. Using
a panel of 49 US States followed over the period 1980-2004, we study
the non-stationarity and cointegration between health spending and in-
come, ultimately measuring income elasticity of health care. The tests
we adopt allow us to explicitly control for cross-section dependence and
unobserved heterogeneity. Speci￿cally, in our regression equations we as-
sume that the error is the sum of a multifactor structure and a spatial
autoregressive process, which capture global shocks and local spill overs
in health expenditure. Our results suggest that health care is a necessity
rather than a luxury, with an elasticity much smaller than that estimated
in other US studies. Further, we observe a signi￿cant spatial spill over,
though with a smaller intensity than that detected in other studies on
spatial concentration of US health spending. Our broad perspective of
cross section dependence as well as the methods used to capture it give
new insights on the debate over the relationship between health spending
and income.
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11 Introduction
Despite years of concern and attempts at cost containment, aggregate health
care expenditure in the US, and other western countries, has increased substan-
tially. This has heated the discussion on the underlying reasons for the rise in
health expenditure, as well as the alternative policy solutions to control such
spending growth. Since the seminal papers by Kleiman (1974) and Newhouse
(1977), much emphasis has been given to the role of income in determining
health care expenditure. The debate is still open on whether health care is a
luxury or a necessity good, namely, if income elasticity of expenditure is above
or below unity (Parkin et al., 1987; Gerdtham et al., 1992; Hitris and Posnett,
1992; Hansen and King, 1996; Blomqvist and Carter, 1997; Di Matteo and Di
Matteo, 1998, Freeman, 2003). The controversy over the nature of health care
has been exacerbated by the policy implications of the empirical results. If one
recognizes that health care is a necessity will often support the idea of greater
public involvement in health care. Conversely, advocates of health care being
a luxury, would argue it is a commodity much like any other and best left to
market forces alone (Culyer, 1988). Empirical evidence varies according to the
statistical units considered in the investigation (Manning et al., 1987; Blomqvist
and Carter, 1997; Getzen, 2000). As the focus shifts from ￿ne disaggregations
of the population (e.g.: individuals, provinces, regions) to larger groups of ac-
tors (e.g., States, Countries), we observe a higher estimated income elasticity
of health care. Put di⁄erently, associations observed between macro-factors do
not seem to re￿ ect associations that exist at the individual level. As pointed
out by Getzen (2000), one reason might be that individual budget constraints
in health spending are largely removed through insurance ￿nancing, while at
aggregate level the resources allocated on health care are constrained by the
budget rather than being in￿ uenced by health status. Another explanation is
that cross-country data are characterised by strong heterogeneity that, if not
properly incorporated in econometric models, could lead to the estimation of
income elasticities greater than one (Hansen and King, 1996). Limiting the
analysis to one country with multiple jurisdictions might reduce this problem.
When looking at the link between spending and income, one important issue
is whether the stationarity assumption holds for both time series variables. It
is well known that the violation of this assumption leads to spurious statistical
results under the OLS (Engle and Granger, 1987). Indeed, if the two series
are both integrated, the absolute value of their correlation coe¢ cient will be
nonzero, whether or not an economic relationship between them exists. Non-
stationarity in the two series introduces the issue of determining whether there
is a long-run equilibrium between health expenditure and income. If both time
series variables are integrated and there exists a linear combination of these
variables that is itself stationary, we can conclude that the two variables are
cointegrated. In this case, the stationary linear combination represents the coin-
tegrating or long-run relationship, which can be speci￿ed in levels with short-run
dynamics modelled via an error correction process. It follows that integration
2and cointegration between spending and income represent fundamental proper-
ties when specifying and interpreting a model for health expenditure.
A large number of studies investigate the non-stationarity in health expendi-
ture and income and their long-run relationship in a panel data framework (Mc-
Coskey and Selden, 1998; Roberts, 1999; Gerdtham and Lothgren, 2000; Oku-
nade and Karakus, 2001; Jewell et al., 2003; Carrion-i-Silvestre, 2005; Dreger
and Reimers, 2005; Freeman, 2003; Wang and Rettenmaier, 2006, Chou, 2007).
Most empirical work has been focusing on OECD countries, while less attention
has been paid to the US case, at a State level. Cross country analysis on the
OECD area provide empirical evidence that is often contradictory. For example,
Gerdtham and Lothgren (2000), using country-by-country and panel unit root
tests, reach the conclusion that in OECD countries health care expenditure and
GDP are non-stationary and cointegrated. Similar results, employing more ad-
vanced econometric techniques, are reported in Dreger and Meiers (2005). On
the contrary, McCoskey and Selden (1998) reject the null of non-stationarity
for health care expenditures and GDP, though they observe that results change
when a time trend is included in the augmented Dickey-Fuller equation. Jewell
et al. (2003) and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2005) conclude that health expenditure
and GDP are stationary around one or two breaks. In general, major concern
is expressed by several authors on how to deal with heterogeneity and cross
section dependence, characteristics that are very likely to be present in health
panel data, when testing for unit roots and cointegration (McCoskey and Selden,
1998; Roberts, 1999).
The empirical evidence on US is scant. Freeman (2003) ￿nds that health
care expenditure and income at State level in the US in the period 1966-1998
are non-stationary and cointegrated, ultimately observing that health care is
a necessity good. More recently, Wang and Rettenmaier (2006), allowing for
structural breaks in unit root tests, support the evidence that spending and
income in US States are non-stationary, though not cointegrated. Further, they
￿nd an income elasticity below 1 for 16 States, and above 1 for the remaining
32 States.
In this paper we aim at giving new insights on the debate over the long-run
economic relationship between health care expenditure and income, focusing on
the US case. Using a panel of 49 US States followed over the period 1980-2004,
we study the non-stationarity and cointegration properties of health spending
and income. Our ultimate goal is to provide an estimate of income elasticity of
health care which is more accurate than that o⁄ered by the current literature.
To this end, we apply newly developed econometric techniques for panel data
that explicitly control for cross-section dependence as well as unobserved het-
erogeneity. Following recent contributions to the literature on panel unit roots,
cross section dependence is incorporated in econometric models through an ap-
proximate multifactor structure (Pesaran, 2006; Bai and Ng, 2004). Speci￿cally,
in our regression equations we assume that the error term is a linear combination
of few common time-speci￿c e⁄ects with heterogeneous loadings plus a spatial
process. Hence, we examine the extent to which spending is driven by income,
3unobservable common shocks and spatial spill overs, determining the speed of
adjustment of health expenditure to deviations from the long-run equilibrium
relation.
Though the issue of cross section dependence in this strand of health eco-
nomics has been tackled by other authors, our broader perspective of cross
section dependence as well as the methods used to capture it give new insights
on the debate on the long-run relationship between health spending and income.
In the following, we ￿rst discuss the issue of contemporaneous correlation
in health expenditure and its econometric representation. We then turn to
a preliminary descriptive analysis of cross section dependence for health and
income. Hence, we compute a set of panel unit root tests to investigate the
possible non-stationarity of temporal patterns of these variables. We perform
a cointegration analysis, focusing on the long-run relationship between health
spending and income, assessing whether expenditure on health care is a necessity
or a luxury good. Finally, we measure the amount of spatial correlation in the
data due the possible presence of spill over e⁄ects.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the issue of
cross section dependence in health expenditure. In Section 3 we introduce the
econometric methods used in the empirical study. Section 4 describes the data
and provides a preliminary exploratory analysis. Section 5 goes through the em-
pirical econometric evidences, giving economic content to the ￿ndings. Finally,
Section 6 ends with some concluding remarks.
2 Cross section dependence in health expendi-
ture
An important characteristic of health expenditure is the presence of cross sec-
tion dependence in the data. The assumption of zero correlation on the shocks
a⁄ecting individual population units1 in a given cross section is very strong and
is not likely to hold in empirical studies of health expenditure. We can recognize
two sources of interdependence among statistical units. The ￿rst arises when
agents react in a similar manner to external forces and unanticipated events
such as technological advances, health shocks, the implementation of new health
policies and sociological structural changes (Andrews, 2003). Correlation arises
because the responses to such common external forces or perturbations is sim-
ilar ￿ though not identical ￿ across individuals. For example, innovations in
diagnostic tools and therapies such as a new vaccine might render treatable
health conditions for which past options consisted only of minimal treatments.
Epidemics or diseases whose incidence suddenly raises regionally or worldwide
might generate a risk adverse behaviour that translates in the accumulation of
drugs and increase of pharmaceutical expenditure. The sexual behaviour of a
generation may also exacerbate the spread of certain epidemics, thus, impact-
ing on health services use. The implementation of new health policies, such
1Population units can be individuals, households, hospitals, cities, states, countries etc.
4as campaigns through the media on highway regulations may reduce avoidable
accidents, ultimately impacting on costs of the health system. These shocks
are often unobservable to the econometrician and perturb the health system
as a whole, simultaneously a⁄ecting the behaviour of agents (e.g., recipients,
providers, etc.), ultimately impacting on health costs. An important feature
of these shocks is that they induce a correlation between pairs of statistical
units that does not depend on how close they are in the geographical space.
Accordingly, we will refer to this type of correlation as long-range or global in-
terdependence. We ￿nally note that some of the unexpected events that a⁄ect
health spending directly might also impact indirectly by hitting the fundamen-
tals of health expenditure, such as disposable income.
An alternative source of interdependence, namely spatial correlation, is re-
lated to location and distance among units, with respect to the geographical,
economic or social space in which they are embedded (Anselin, 2001). Neigh-
bouring US States may share common general population characteristics or
underlying socio-economic features that have an e⁄ect on the consumption of
health care resources. For example, environmental stressors such as air pol-
lution could be linked to regional rather than simply local trends, in￿ uencing
prevalence and need across a wide area, eventually a⁄ecting health spending
(Moscone et al., 2007). States from the Southwest region, such as Arizona and
Texas, are likely to face high rates of illegal immigration, which may directly or
indirectly in￿ uence their health costs. Spatial correlation might also be gener-
ated by cross State borders movements of health services bene￿ciaries (Centers
for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2007). Indeed, it is plausible that individuals
move to regions whose revenues and expenditure pattern best match their pref-
erences (Tiebout, 1956; Baicker, 2005). Other reasons of why we should expect
spatial dependence in health spending have been suggested by a recent strand
of literature in public economics and health economics, which focuses on strate-
gic interaction among jurisdictions in deciding resources allocation (Brueckner,
2000; Revelli, 2006, Moscone et al., 2007a, 2007b; Moscone and Knapp, 2005;
Costa-i-Font and Moscone, 2007).
From the above discussion it emerges that reactions to external events as
well as spatial spill overs are likely to induce a structure of correlation in health
expenditure data. The distinction between global interdependence and local
correlation arising from spatial spill overs is that the latter concerns only ￿nite
subsets of statistical units that do not spread widely as sample size increases.
When data contain cross section dependence, conventional estimators such
as ordinary least squares are ine¢ cient, and the estimated standard errors are
biased (Andrews, 2003). Phillips and Sul (2003) proved that when cross section
dependence occurs but is not incorporated in the panel regression, the pooled
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator provides little gain in precision compared
with single OLS equation. Further, least squares may be biased if regressors
are correlated with the source of interdependence. Ignoring contemporaneous
correlation has also serious drawbacks on commonly used panel unit root tests.
5Indeed, stationary tests that assume independence might have substantial size
distortions when this assumption does not hold (Phillips and Sul, 2003; Maddala
and Wu, 1999).
Few works on health expenditure explicitly account for cross section depen-
dence when studying its long-run economic relationships. Jewell et al. (2003)
control for contemporaneous correlation by introducing time-speci￿c e⁄ects in
the econometric speci￿cation. However, the inclusion of time-varying e⁄ects
implies that the common shocks have identical in￿ uences on each unit, an as-
sumption that might be quite restrictive in empirical analysis. In fact, it is
reasonable to expect the e⁄ect of global shocks to vary considerably across indi-
viduals, also depending on the characteristics of the population units. To allow
for more general error cross section dependence, other studies build the empirical
distribution of unit root test statistics by bootstrap techniques (Freeman, 2003;
Carrion-i-Silvestre, 2005; Wang and Rettenmaier, 2006; Chou, 2007). How-
ever, the bootstrap procedure is subject to size distortions in ￿nite samples,
particularly in cases where N is small relative to T, as in the study of health
expenditure in the OECD countries (Maddala and Wu, 1999). Also, a recent
Monte Carlo study in Smith et al. (2004) indicates that the bootstrap statistic
tends to be undersized when N and T are the same order of magnitude.
In the following we review a number of methods that allow us to study the
long-run relationship of health care expenditure in the US, taking into account
possible cross section correlation arising from unobservable common shocks and
local interdependence.
3 Methods
3.1 The econometric model
The econometric framework of our analysis is the following simple linear het-
erogeneous panel
hit = ￿i + ￿iyit + uit; i = 1;:::N;t = 1;:::T; (1)
where hit and yit indicate, respectively, the logarithm of real per-capita health
expenditure and the logarithm of real per-capita disposable income in the ith
State at time t, ￿i is a State-speci￿c intercept, and uit is the error term. In this
paper we suggest to incorporate in equation (1) cross section dependence arising
from global shocks by assuming that the errors have the following multifactor
structure
uit = ￿0
ift + ￿it; (2)
in which ft is the m￿1 vector of unobserved common e⁄ects and ￿it is a State-
speci￿c error. The coe¢ cients ￿ij; for i = 1;:::;N and j = 1;:::;m, are called
factor loadings, and represent the sensitivities of statistical units, here the US
States, to movements in the factors ft. Hence, according to this speci￿cation,
each State can respond, with a di⁄erent intensity, to unanticipated events, or
perturbations, such as new medical technologies and health shocks.
6We incorporate cross section dependence arising from spatial spill overs by
assuming that ￿it follows a spatial autoregressive process (Cli⁄ and Ord, 1981)
￿it = ￿￿it + "it; (3)





is the so-called spatial lag of ￿it (Anselin, 1988). wij is the generic (i;j)th
element of a N ￿ N nonnegative matrix, W, known as spatial weights matrix,
which provides information on the neighborhood linkages among States. In our
empirical study we de￿ne neighbourliness via a contiguity criterion, and assign
wij = 1 when States i and j share a common border or vertex, and wij = 0
otherwise. Hence, in model (3) the error term, ￿it, associated to the ith State
at a point in time t depends on the average of errors in its adjacent States at
time t.
In model (1), we allow yit to be correlated with the unobserved e⁄ects ft,
and assume that
yit = ci + ￿
0
ift + vit: i = 1;:::N;t = 1;:::T; (4)
where ￿i is a m ￿ 1 vector of factor loadings, and vit is an error term assumed
to be distributed independently of the common factors ft and of "it. Therefore,
common factors can impact on health expenditure not only directly via the
factor structure (2), but also indirectly by hitting income via equation (4).
To sum up, model (1)-(4) represents the relationship between health spend-
ing and income, taking into account the sources of cross section dependence
described in Section 2, namely global shocks and spatial spill overs.
Our estimation and testing strategy is based on the Common Correlated Ef-
fects (CCE) approach advanced by Pesaran (2006). According to this method,
the unobservable e⁄ects ft can be well approximated by the cross section aver-
ages of the dependent and explanatory variables. As a way of illustrating this
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and consider the simple cross section average of (5)

































￿ zt ￿ ￿ b ￿ ￿ ￿t
￿
(7)
Under the condition that the spatial weights matrix, W, has bounded absolute
row and column sums, it is possible to show that (Pesaran and Tosetti, 2007)
￿ ￿t
q:m:
! 0; as N ! 1:
It follows that the cross section averages, ￿ zt, can be used to approximate the
common factors. Hence, the slope parameters ￿i can be consistently estimated
applying standard panel techniques to the following equation
hit = ￿i + ￿iyit + g0
i￿ zt + eit; (8)
where ￿ zt =
￿￿ ht; ￿ yt
￿0
. Once the slope parameters have been estimated, since ￿ zt
is consistent for ft, the spatial coe¢ cient ￿ in (3) can be obtained by applying
the maximum likelihood method (Anselin, 1988) to residuals ^ eit from equation
(8). Estimation of income elasticity (average, and State by State) is provided
in Section 5.2, while the estimation of the spatial parameter is considered in
Section 5.5.








i ￿ Mhi; (9)
with M = IT ￿ ￿ H
￿￿ H0 ￿ H




with ￿ = (1;::::;1)0 and ￿ Z
being the T ￿ 2 matrix of observations on ￿ zt, t = 1;:::;T. Further, he proposes
















i ￿ Mhi: (11)
The ￿rst, known as CCE Mean Group estimator, is a simple average of the
individual CCE estimators in (9). The second is the CCE Pooled estimator,
which gains e¢ ciency from pooling observations. Their variances is provided in
Pesaran (2006).
Monte Carlo studies in Pesaran (2006) and in Pesaran and Tosetti (2007)
have shown that these estimators perform well in small samples as small as
8N=20 and T=10. We stress that one important advantage of this approach is
that it does not require to know the number of factors m. Further, it allows
common factors and the idiosyncratic component, ￿it, to be serially correlated,
and it yields consistent estimators regardless of the factors being stationary
or non-stationary, as long as ￿it is stationary and m is a ￿nite ￿xed number
(Kapetanios at al., 2006).
Before concluding, we note that model (1)-(4) is able to capture some discon-
tinuities in the relationship between spending and income by the means of the
factor structure. However, we remark that it does not allow for the presence of
structural breaks in the slope coe¢ cients, ￿i. In principle, we do recognize the
potential role of structural breaks in the relation between health expenditure
and income. However, we believe that this would be marginal in our empirical
application given the relatively short time span considered (see Section 4).
In the following section, we explain how the CCE approach can be adopted
when testing for unit roots, controlling for cross section dependence. Again, the
idea is to use cross section averages of health expenditure and disposable income
as proxies for the unobserved common factors, in the context of a Dickey Fuller
regression.
3.2 Testing for unit roots
Consider the pth order augmented Dickey Fuller regression
￿qit = ai + biqi;t￿1 + cit +
p X
j=1
dij￿qi;t￿j + uit; (12)
where qit is either the logarithm of real per-capita health spending, the logarithm
of real disposable income, or regression residuals from equation (1). uit are
errors that we assume to have a single factor structure, where the idiosyncratic
component follows a spatial autoregressive process as in (3). When testing for
unit roots, the null hypothesis is
H0 : bi = 0;i = 1;:::;N; (13)
against the alternative that (Breitung and Pesaran, 2007)
H1 : bi < 0;i = 1;:::;N1;bi = 0;i = N1 + 1;:::;N; (14)
where N1 is such that N1=N is nonzero and tends to a ￿xed constant as N
goes to in￿nity. Following the same rational as in Section 3.1, we consider the
following Dickey Fuller (CADF) regression augmented with the cross section
averages ￿ qt￿1 and ￿￿ qt￿j, for j = 0;:::;p




i￿ zt + eit: (15)
9where ￿ zt = (￿ qt￿1;￿￿ qt;￿￿ qt￿1;:::;￿￿ qt￿p)
0. Pesaran (2007) proposes to test (13)
against (14) by computing the simple average of the t-ratios of the OLS esti-







where ~ ti is the OLS t-ratio of bi. The critical values for the CIPS tests are
given in Tables 2(a)-2(c) in Pesaran (2007).
We remark that the CIPS unit roots test requires that the errors uit in
(12) have a single factor structure. However, controlling for only one global
shock might not be enough to capture the whole, long-range, contemporaneous
correlation present in the data. In our empirical investigation we provide some
statistics of cross section dependence after having controlled for such common
factor to see whether signi￿cant correlation is left in the residuals.
3.3 Cross section dependence tests
We now brie￿ y review some statistics of cross section dependence that we use
in our empirical work. A statistic which captures the overall amount of cross
section dependence in the data, at a descriptive level, is the following average

























and qit is either the logarithm of real per-capita health spending or the logarithm
of real disposable income, expressed in ￿rst di⁄erences, or regression residuals
from equations (1), and (12).
We also consider two diagnostic tests for cross section dependence, based on

























10Under the null hypothesis of no cross section dependence, the CDP tends to a
N(0;1) for N and T going to in￿nity in any order, and the CDLM tends to
a N(0;1) with T ! 1 and then N ! 1. We note that, while the CDP is
based on the pair-wise correlation coe¢ cients, the CDLM uses their squares. In
practice, the CDP test might give misleading results when the cross correlations
cover negative as well as positive values. Though the CDLM does not su⁄er from
this problem, we note that it is likely to exhibit some size distortions for N large
and T small (Frees, 1995).
These statistics measure the average amount of dependency between all pairs
of units. They assign equal weights to all pairwise correlations regardless the
geographical position of the US States. In other words, in these statistics the
correlation between California and Maine has the same importance as the corre-
lation between California and its adjacent States such as Oregon. Accordingly,
the above CD statistics do not consider the distance decay e⁄ect that underlies
spatial interaction theory, and should be interpreted as measures of long-range
or global dependency.
In our empirical study we also test for spatial correlation, after having con-
trolled for long-range dependence represented by the common factors structure.
























^ eit ￿ ^ e:t
￿2
, and wij, i;j = 1;:::;N, are the spatial weights,
and ^ eit, for i = 1;:::;N, are the estimated regression residuals in (8) or in (15).
The Moran￿ s I is asymptotically normally distributed3 as N goes to in￿nity, for
￿xed T. Spatial statistics such as the Moran￿ s I di⁄er from the CD statistics
(17)-(19) since they exploit information on the spatial ordering of data, giving
more importance to States that are close to each other. As such, the Moran￿ s
I should be interpreted as a measure of local cross section dependence. In the
computation of (20), again we use contiguity as measure of distance among
States, and assign a non-zero link only to pairs of States that share a common
border or vertex.
4 Data description
Our investigation uses annual data on the US States plus the District of Columbia,
from 1980 to 2004. Given their unusual socio-economic characteristics we ex-
cluded Alaska and Hawaii from our analysis, leaving us with 49 units.
We gathered data on personal health care expenditure at State level from
the Centers of Medicaid and Medicare Services4. This aggregate, which repre-
sents the total amount spent to treat individuals, includes private funds, mainly
2Note that we compute an average of the Moran￿ s It for each t.
3The mean and variance of It can be found in Kelejian and Prucha (2001).
4http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
11private insurance and out-of-pockets payments, and public resources, for the
majority composed by Medicare and public assistance (Medicaid)5. On aggre-
gate, in the US, private funds represent the largest ￿gure of total expenditure,
though we observe that they have been decreasing over time, from 58 per cent
in the 1980 to roughly 54 per cent as a proportion of total expenditure. We note
that personal health care expenditure is measured by the States of the provider
without distinguishing between local and cross-border bene￿ciaries of services.
We obtained data on disposable income and the State population from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis6. Finally, as there is no US State level consumer
price index (CPI), we constructed State level general price index, based on
the CPI of the cities/areas7, which are available from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics8. We used this index to de￿ ate health expenditure and income.
We begin our empirical investigation with a preliminary analysis on the
spatial distribution and concentration of health expenditure and income across
the 49 US States. In Table 2 we show the statistics (17)-(19) for the ￿rst
di⁄erences of the logarithm of per-capita health expenditure and per-capita
income. Results suggest the existence of cross section correlation among States
of pervasive nature, which should be taken into consideration when studying
income elasticity. At this stage we have not tested for spatial correlation in
the data, something that we will do after controlling for long-range dependence
arising from the common factor structure (see Section 5). However, in Table 3
we show the average correlation coe¢ cients within and between the 8 Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) regions9, which provides a subdivision of US states
in larger units that are similar in terms of historical development, population
characteristics, and economy. This should capture at descriptive level spatial
concentrations of our variables across the territory. Looking at the values in the
diagonal of Table 3, compared with the o⁄-diagonal elements, we observe that
for many regions the within region correlation is larger than the between region
correlation. Such di⁄erence is more marked for income than for spending. For
example, the States of the Mideast region are more correlated on average among
themselves than with the States of South West, both for spending and income.
The di⁄erence is more marked for income. This might suggest the presence of
geographical concentration both in health expenditure and income, though with
a more important role in the latter. We will explore these issues later in the
paper.
5See Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, (2007) for a description of Medicare and
Medicaid aggregates.
6http://bea.gov/
7In doing this, we followed the procedure outlined in Holly et al. (2007).
8http://www.bls.gov/
9See Table 1 for a list of the States belonging to BEA regions.
125 Empirical evidences
5.1 Non-stationarity of health expenditure and income
Table 4 reports the CIPS statistics for the logarithm of real per-capita health
expenditure and real per-capita disposable income for the 49 US States over the
years from 1980 to 2004 for the lag orders p = 0;1;2;3. The inclusion of lags
allow us to control for possible serial correlation in the data.
Health expenditure is non-stationary when including an intercept, as well as
when adding an intercept and a linear trend in the CADF regression. The non-
stationary nature of health care expenditure may be explained by the increase
of disposable income, as well as changes in medical technology and treatment.
As for income, the unit root hypothesis is rejected when an intercept only is
included, while it cannot be rejected in the intercept and trend case, for any
choice of p. Given the trended nature of our variables, these results lead us
to conclude that health expenditure and disposable income are non-stationary.
This empirical evidence is consistent with research on US data at a State level
by Freeman (2003) and other works on national-level OECD data by Blomqvist
and Carter (1997) and Gerdtham and Lothgren (2000).
In Table 5 we compute the cross section dependence statistics (17)-(19) on
residuals from the CADF regressions, before and after having controlled for the
common factor. Speci￿cally, in panel (A) we base the CD statistics on residuals
^ uit = ￿qit￿^ ai￿^ biqi;t￿1￿^ cit￿
p X
j=1
^ dij￿qi;t￿j, while in panel (B) we use residuals





i￿ zt where ￿ zt = (￿ qt￿1;￿￿ qt;￿￿ qt￿1;:::;￿￿ qt￿p)
0, (see equation (15)).
As we move from panel (A) to panel (B) all CD statistics report a sizeable
reduction in the degree of cross section dependence, with the average pairwise
correlation coe¢ cient going from roughly 55 per cent for health spending (40
per cent for disposable income) to zero. It follows that the inclusion of cross
section averages in the ADF regressions, as in (15), seems to capture well the
cross section dependence present in the data. This may suggest that the CIPS
panel unit root test can e⁄ectively deal with correlation across section. Panel
(B) in Table 5 also reports the Moran￿ s I test statistic on ^ eit, to check whether
there exists any residual spatial correlation after having controlled for the com-
mon factor. Results show a signi￿cant value for the Moran￿ s I for disposable
income and not for health care expenditure. This is in line with our preliminary
exploratory statistics that suggested the presence of geographical concentration
both in health expenditure and income, though more pronounced in the latter.
5.2 The income elasticity of health expenditure
We now turn our attention to the relationship between health expenditure and
disposable income.
13Table 6 reports the estimated income elasticity for each of the 49 States. It
clearly emerges a wide variation in how health expenditure responds to income
across territory. Though elasticity is above unity for six States, it is signif-
icantly larger than 1, indicating that health care is a luxury good, only for
four States, namely Washington, Wisconsin, South Carolina and Florida. The
majority of the States presents an income elasticity lower than one, con￿rming
that health care is, overall, a necessity good. We note that three States, namely,
Maine, North Dakota, and District of Columbia, display negative signi￿cant co-
e¢ cients, while several other States show statistically insigni￿cant coe¢ cients.
One reason behind these results might be that there exist unobserved cross bor-
der movements of recipients that alter the relationship between health spending
and income at State level. This problem is more pronounced when estimating
a State by State elasticity than when considering the average relation, since
averaging is likely to cancel out the estimation error due to movements. Fi-
nally, we note that estimating coe¢ cients States by States reduces the degrees
of freedom, implying wider con￿dence intervals.
Our results di⁄er from those in Wang and Rettenmeir (2006), who obtain
an income elasticity between 0 and 1 in 16 States, and larger than 1 in 32
States. However, we note that when estimating elasticity, they do not allow for
contemporaneous correlation10, which might lead to erroneous conclusions. We
further observe that they do not report the t-statistics and associated p-values
for their estimates of income elasticity.
Table 7 reports results from the ￿xed e⁄ects (FE) estimation (column I),
the CCE Mean Group (column II), and the CCE Pooled estimator (column
III). From column I the coe¢ cient on income is roughly 0.90. However, such
estimator, ignoring the sizeable amount of cross section dependence in spend-
ing, is likely to be seriously biased. Our FE coe¢ cient, though close to 1, is
smaller than that obtained by Freeman (2003), which is roughly 1.30. We note
that Freeman￿ s study di⁄ers from ours in a number of characteristics that might
explain (in part) the di⁄erences in the FE estimation. First, Freeman￿ s analysis
covers the time period from 1966 to 1998, which is di⁄erent from ours. Fur-
ther, in his study health care spending is missing in some years, and has been
estimated via geometric interpolation, thus adding uncertainty on his results.
Finally, while we use the State level CPI index as de￿ ator of expenditure and
income, Freeman adopts the national CPI.
When controlling for cross section dependence, the coe¢ cient on income is
signi￿cantly lower, 0.45 in the CCE Mean Group and 0.36 for the CCE Pooled
estimator. Overall, our results show that growth in income boosts health ex-
penditure. However, health expenditure rises less than proportionally, thus,
supporting the hypothesis that health care is a necessity good. This is in line
with Freeman (2003), who, by using a dynamic OLS approach, obtains an elas-
ticity of 0.82. The relatively low income elasticity we obtain supports the idea
that, while the ability to pay is a determinant of health care spending, the exis-
10They allow for cross section dependence only when testing for non-stationarity.
14tence of publicly ￿nanced programmes such as Medicare and Medicaid weakens
the link between disposable income and the standard of care.
Table 7 also reports the cross section dependence statistics (17)-(19) on
residuals from the CCE regression, before and after having controlled for com-
mon factors. We observe the sizeable reduction of contemporaneous correlation
when passing from panel (A) to panel (B). In panel (B), the average pairwise
correlation coe¢ cient and the CDP test statistic indicate that there is no signif-
icant long-range cross section dependence left in the residuals, once controlled
for common factors. On the contrary, the CDLM points to the existence of
signi￿cant cross section dependence in the residuals. One reason behind such
di⁄erence might be that CDLM is detecting some spatial correlation present in
the data, an hypothesis that is supported by the signi￿cant value obtained for
the Moran￿ s I test. This issue will be explored in Section 5.5.
We conclude this section by checking how robust our estimated income elas-
ticity is when controlling for other non-income determinants of health expen-
diture that have been identi￿ed by the literature (Karatzas, 2000; Hansen and
King, 1996; Hitiris and Posnett, 1992). We have estimated by CCE Mean Group
and by ￿xed e⁄ects four di⁄erent speci￿cations that include the following vari-
ables: percentage of people over 65 years old, numer of phisicians per 100,000
population, numer of beds per 100,000 population11, and the share of public
￿nanced total health spending12. Table 8 shows that the CCE Mean Group
estimation of income elasticity is robust to the introduction of other regressors,
falling in the range 0.36-0.43. The FE estimator still remains close to one. We
also report a not signi￿cant e⁄ect of people over 65 on health spending, and
a negative relationship between proportion of public spending and total health
expenditure. This latter result might indicate the importance of fostering public
expenditure in reducing total health expenditure.
5.3 Cointegration analysis
The possibility of cointegration between health expenditure and disposable in-
come is explored using a two-stages procedure, along the lines suggested by
Pesaran et al. (2006), Chang (2005), and Bai and Kao (2006). In a ￿rst step
we estimate the CCE Mean Group (CCE Pooled) estimator ^ ￿ and compute
the residuals ^ uit = hit ￿ ^ ￿yit ￿ ^ ￿i; while in the second stage we run the CIPS
panel unit root tests to assess whether ^ uit is stationary. If results lead to a
rejection of a unit root in ^ uit, we can conclude that health spending and income
are cointegrated. One advantage of this procedure is that we take into account
contemporaneous correlation in both steps, rather than only in one step as in
11These data have been gathered from the Statistical Abstract of the United States.
12This variable has been computed as the ratio of Medicare and Medicaid spending over
total health expenditure. Note that Medicare and Medicaid expenditures account for roughly
90% of public health spending.
15Wang and Rettenmeir (2006). As a comparator, we also implement this two-
stages procedure using the ￿xed e⁄ects estimator in the ￿rst step, which ignores
cross section dependence.
As shown in Table 9, when using the FE estimator, we reject the unit root
hypothesis in the residuals, for p = 0;1. The use of the CCE Mean Group
or Pooled estimators in the ￿rst step shows that residuals are stationary for
p = 0;1;2, leading to a strongest evidence in favour of the existence of a long-run
relationship between health spending and income. On the basis of these results
we can conclude that health spending and income are cointegrated, hence, that
the rise in health expenditure is sustained by movements in disposable income.
This conclusion conforms well to the of work of Freeman (2003), who, by
using ￿rst generation panel unit root tests on OLS residuals, ￿nds evidence
of cointegration between expenditure and income. We note however that his
procedure neglects the possibility that observations are correlated. Finally, our
conclusions diverge from those in Wang and Rettenmeir (2006), who report
weak evidence on the existence of cointegration in a State by State analysis.
Their analysis is based on Maddala and Wu (1999) test applied to the residuals
from an OLS regression where one structural break is permitted. To allow for
dependent observations they compute the empirical distribution of their unit
root tests via the bootstrap method. However, the approach used to compute
the residuals does not allow for cross section dependence. Further, we remark
that the properties of the bootstrap method applied to Maddala and Wu test
have not yet been explored for the case of N larger than T, as in the study by
Wang and Rettenmeir (2006).
5.4 Error correction model
Having established the existence of a cointegration relationship, we now turn to
the estimation of the following error correction model
￿hit = ￿i + ￿i
￿
hi;t￿1 ￿ ^ ￿yi;t￿1
￿
+ #i￿hi;t￿1 + ￿i￿yit + uit; (21)
where in the parenthesis we have the previous period￿ s cointegrating relation.
Again we estimated the above model using 49 US States followed over 25 years.
The coe¢ cient ￿i measures the speed of adjustment of health care spending
to a deviation from the long-run equilibrium relation between expenditure and
disposable income. We ￿rst estimate (21) by ￿xed e⁄ects and then by CCE
method, where factors are approximated by ￿￿ ht;￿￿ ht￿1;￿￿ yt; and ￿ ht￿1￿^ ￿￿ yt￿1,
where ^ ￿ is the estimated income elasticity with either the ￿xed e⁄ects, the CCE
Mean Group or the CCE Pooled estimator. Table 10 reports the results. For all
estimators the coe¢ cient of the error correction term has the expected, negative,
sign. However, the ￿xed e⁄ects estimator reveals a speed of adjustment of -0.05,
much lower than that assessed by the CCE, respectively -0.31 and -0.20 for the
MG and Pooled estimators. The extremely low speed of adjustment of the ￿xed
e⁄ects estimator might re￿ ect some distortions due to the fact that it ignores
cross the section dependence present in the data.
165.5 Estimating spatial correlation
We now focus on the estimation of the spatial coe¢ cient in model (3). We aim
at measuring the amount of spatial correlation due to unobserved spill overs,
after adjusting for cross section dependence due to common factors. We consider
the residuals ^ eit = hit ￿ ^ ￿MGyit ￿ ^ g0
i￿ zt, where the common factors have been
approximated by ￿ zt, the cross section averages of hit and yit, and estimate
^ eit = ￿^ eit + "it:
The above model has been estimated by maximum likelihood (Anselin, 1988).
We obtain a signi￿cant spatial coe¢ cient ^ ￿ of 0.30, with a standard error of
0.035, yielding a z-value of 8.571. This result supports the existence of some un-
observable risk factors geographically concentrated that a⁄ect health spending,
or the presence of cross State borders movements of health services bene￿ciaries
(Tiebout, 1956). This also conforms well with the empirical ￿ndings in Baicker
(2005), who has found that individual State￿ s medical spending has a signi￿cant
and positive spill over e⁄ect on the spending of its neighbours. However, her
study shows that each dollar of State spending causes spending in neighboring
States to increase by almost 90 cents, a value which is much higher than that
found in our analysis. Our smaller spatial coe¢ cient might be explained by the
fact that data have been purged by the e⁄ect of common shocks.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, using a panel of 49 US States followed over 25 years, we have
investigated the non-stationarity and cointegration properties of health care ex-
penditure and personal disposable income. We aimed at contributing to the
existing debate on whether health care is a luxury or a necessity good. Recent
work in this ￿eld has recognized that cross section dependence is an important
feature of health care spending. However, we argue that correlation across sec-
tions has not yet been dealt with in a satisfactory manner. Hence, in this paper
we discuss the possible sources of interdependence, namely, the existence of un-
observable global shocks, and the presence of spill over e⁄ects. We then review
the recently advanced CCE approach to study the non-stationarity and cointe-
gration of health spending and income, assuming that cross section dependence
is generated by a common factor structure and a spatial process.
Our panel unit root tests suggest that both variables are integrated and
that they exhibit a long-run relation. The increase of disposable income and
changes in technology and treatment are the likely explanation for the rising of
health care expenditures. Further, we estimate an income elasticity below unity,
suggesting that health is a necessity good. This evidence is supported by the
estimate of both average and State by State elasticities. We remark that our
estimated average elasticity is much lower than that detected in other studies
at US State level. The relatively low coe¢ cient for disposable income we obtain
supports the hypothesis that, while the ability to pay is a determinant of health
17care spending, the existence of publicly ￿nanced programmes such as Medicare
and Medicaid weakens the link between income and the standard of care. In
our empirical analysis, we have also estimated the amount of spatial correlation
in the data, after having controlled for common factors. Results indicate the
presence of a signi￿cant spatial spill over, though smaller than that identi￿ed
in other studies.
In conclusion, our analysis points out the existence of global and local forms
of cross section dependence in health spending and income, that, if not taken into
account in the study of health expenditure, are likely to provide policy makers
with misleading results. It would be interesting to use this approach to analyse
health spending for the OECD countries, to see if the same conclusions hold in
the case of a group of heterogenous, cross sectionally dependent countries.
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Southwest (SWST) Arizona,New Mexico,Oklahoma,Texas
Rocky Mountain (RKMT) Colorado,Idaho,Montana,Utah,Wyoming
Far West (FWST) Alaska,California,Hawaii,Nevada,Oregon,Washington
(A): Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
23Table 2: Cross section dependence in the ￿rst di⁄erences of the logarithm of real per-capita health
expenditure and of the logarithm of real per-capita disposable income.
￿ CDP CDLM
￿hit 0.851 142.98 399.64
￿yit 0.621 104.30 221.36
Notes: ￿, CDP,CDLM are computed as in (17),(18) and (19), respectively.
Table 3: Average of pairwise correlation coe¢ cients within and between BEA regions of
￿rst di⁄erences of log of real health expenditure and of log of real per-capita disposable income




SEST 0.862 0.884 0.900
GLAK 0.858 0.882 0.890 0.888
PLNS 0.824 0.844 0.870 0.866 0.861
SWST 0.801 0.841 0.851 0.834 0.822 0.825
RKMT 0.806 0.840 0.860 0.844 0.835 0.839 0.862




SEST 0.668 0.713 0.750
GLAK 0.739 0.700 0.765 0.845
PLNS 0.492 0.517 0.619 0.644 0.654
SWST 0.515 0.594 0.627 0.623 0.513 0.509
RKMT 0.374 0.539 0.543 0.514 0.453 0.551 0.549
FWST 0.618 0.644 0.621 0.658 0.494 0.575 0.511 0.697
Notes: See Table 1 for de￿nition of regions. The ￿gures are average of sample pairwise
correlation coe¢ cients (see notes to Table 2).
24Table 4: CIPS panel unit roots tests
CADF(0) CADF(1) CADF(2) CADF(3)
With an intercept only
hit -1.761 -1.978 -1.941 -1.828
yit -2.167￿ -2.337￿ -2.348￿ -2.159￿
With an intercept and trend
hit -2.353 -2.548 -2.374 -2.319
yit -2.117 -2.349 -2.485 -2.238
Notes: The 5% critical value for the intercept only case is -2.11; the 5% critical value for the intercept
and trend case is -2.62. The superscript "￿" indicates that the test is signi￿cant at the 5% level.
25Table 5: Cross section dependence in residuals from CADF regression
CADF(0) CADF(1) CADF(2) CADF(3)
(A): Use of ^ uit
￿ ￿
hit 0.555 0.550 0.530 0.571
yit 0.406 0.390 0.352 0.294
CDP
hit 87.151 86.376 83.250 89.808
yit 63.729 61.241 55.381 46.215
CDLM
hit 157.388 155.520 155.758 168.132
yit 91.698 88.010 82.715 71.475
(B): Use of ^ eit
￿ ￿
hit -0.019 -0.019 -0.017 -0.015
yit -0.000 0.004 0.008 0.023
CDP
hit -3.021 -3.008 -2.703 -2.402
yit -0.018 0.606 1.211 3.615
CDLM
hit 10.649 11.593 12.196 16.748
yit 19.666 18.255 18.691 19.843
Moran
hit 1.323 1.329 1.089 1.214
yit 2.470 2.436 2.160 1.503
(A): The CD statistics are computed on ^ uit= ￿qit￿^ ai￿^ biqi;t￿1￿^ cit for CADF(0) and on
^ uit= ￿qit￿^ ai￿^ biqi;t￿1￿^ cit￿
p X
j=1
^ dij￿qi;t￿j for CADF(p), with p=1,2,3.
(B): The CD statistics are computed on ^ eit= ￿qit ￿ ^ ai ￿^ biqi;t￿1 ￿ ^ cit￿^ g0
i￿ zt for CADF(0)




i￿ zt for CADF(p), with p=1,2,3, where
￿ zt=(￿ qt￿1;￿￿ qt;￿￿ qt￿1;:::;￿￿ qt￿p)
0 , qit being hit or yit
We report Moran =
I￿E(I)
std(I) , where I is given by (20).
26Table 6: CCE estimate of the coe¢ cients by State
State Coe⁄. Std. err. State Coe⁄. Std. err.
Washington 1.514￿ 0.263 Ohio -0.021 0.184
Montana 0.512￿ 0.140 Illinois -0.168 0.377
Maine -0.926￿ 0.353 District of Columbia -0.689￿ 0.311
North Dakota -0.125￿ 0.039 Delaware 0.053 0.212
South Dakota 0.765￿ 0.309 West Virginia 0.781￿ 0.132
Wyoming 0.347￿ 0.046 Maryland 0.157 0.142
Wisconsin 1.311￿ 0.141 Colorado 0.348 0.462
Idaho 0.185 0.105 Kentucky 1.304￿ 0.280
Vermont -0.258 0.722 Kansas 0.653 0.450
Minnesota 0.244 0.248 Virginia 0.264 0.184
Oregon 0.386 0.259 Missouri 0.252 0.290
New Hampshire 0.793￿ 0.166 Arizona -0.199 0.381
Iowa 0.588￿ 0.289 Oklahoma 0.730￿ 0.140
Massachusetts 0.366￿ 0.056 North Carolina 0.245 0.334
Nebraska 0.145 0.454 Tennessee 0.615￿ 0.118
New York -0.103 0.092 Texas 0.187 0.139
Pennsylvania 0.688￿ 0.163 New Mexico 0.950￿ 0.377
Connecticut 1.137￿ 0.171 Alabama 0.933￿ 0.134
Rhode Island 0.344 0.238 Mississippi 1.002￿ 0.493
New Jersey 0.804￿ 0.346 Georgia 1.145￿ 0.394
Indiana 0.110 0.133 South Carolina 1.744￿ 0.350
Nevada 0.019 0.190 Arkansas -0.126 0.183
Utah 0.804￿ 0.701 Louisiana -0.238 0.249
California 0.116 0.253 Florida 1.429￿ 0.181
Michigan 0.856￿ 0.192
Average slope 0.448￿ 0.080
Notes: The individual coe¢ cients have been computed according to formula (9),
and their variance as in (??). The superscript "￿" means that the coe¢ cient
is signi￿cant at 5% level.
27Table 7: Estimation results: income elasticity of health expenditure
Fixed E⁄ects(+) CCE Mean Group CCE Pooled
Coe⁄. Std.err. Coe⁄. Std.err. Coe⁄. Std.err.
y 0.908￿ 0.033 0.448￿ 0.080 0.363￿ 0.097
CD statistics




(B): Use of ^ eit
￿ - -0.019 -0.020
CDP - -3.273 -3.336
CDLM - 21.305 21.049
Moran - 4.754 4.706
Notes: (+): time dummies were included. The superscript "￿" indicates that
the coe¢ cient is signi￿cant at the 5% level.
(A): The CD statistics are computed on ^ uit= hit￿^ ￿i￿^ ￿yit,
(B): The CD statistics are computed on ^ eit= hit￿^ ￿i￿^ ￿yit￿^ g0
i￿ zt
where ￿ zt=
￿￿ ht; ￿ yt
￿0





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Table 9: CIPS panel unit roots tests on residuals from CCE estimation (intercept only case)
CADF(0) CADF(1) CADF(2) CADF(3)
Fixed E⁄ects
^ uit -2.496￿ -2.639￿ -2.081 -1.594
CCE Mean Group
^ uit -2.210￿ -2.175￿ -2.121￿ -1.827
CCE Pooled
^ uit -2.225￿ -2.174￿ -2.130￿ -1.999
Notes: Residual from CCE Mean Group estimation in Table 7. Critical value for the intercept only case -2.11.
The superscript "￿" indicates that the test is signi￿cant a the 5% level.
30Table 10: Error correction model
Fixed E⁄ects(+) CCE Mean Group CCE Pooled
Coe⁄. Std.err. Coe⁄. Std.err. Coe⁄. Std.err.
hi;t￿1￿b ￿yi;t￿1 -0.004￿ 0.002 -0.3031￿ 0.033 -0.205￿ 0.048
￿hi;t￿1 0.008 0.029 0.002 0.034 -0.019 0.035
￿yit 0.261￿ 0.030 0.396￿ 0.046 0.307￿ 0.069
CD statistics
(A): Use of ^ uit
￿ - 0.9175 0.853
CDP - 147.583 137.149
CDLM - 427.515 369.283
(B): Use of ^ eit
￿ - -0.019 -0.020
CDP - -3.112 -3.164
CDLM - 18.771 13.697
Moran - 3.772 3.698
Notes: the superscript "*" indicates that the coe¢ cient is signi￿cant at the 5% level.
(+): time dummies were included.
(A): The CD statistics are computed on ^ uit= ￿hit￿^ ￿i￿^ ￿
￿
hit ￿ b ￿yit
￿
￿^ #￿hi;t￿1 ￿ ^ ￿￿yi;t￿1,
(B): The CD statistics are computed on ^ eit= ￿hit￿^ ￿i￿^ ￿
￿
hit ￿ b ￿yit
￿
￿^ #￿hi;t￿1 ￿ ^ ￿￿yi;t￿1￿^ g
0
i￿ zt
where ￿ zt =
￿
￿￿ ht;￿ ht￿1￿b ￿￿ yt￿1;￿￿ ht￿1;￿￿ yt￿1
￿0
. For the Moran statistic see the notes to Table 5.
31